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Abstract 
This paper examines the uncertainties in Chinese gas markets, analyze the reasons and quantify 
their impact on the world gas market. A literature review found significant variability among the 
outlooks on China's gas sector. Further assessment found that uncertainties in economic growth, 
structural change in markets, environmental regulations, price and institutional changes 
contribute to the uncertainties. The analysis of China’s demand and supply uncertainties with a 
world gas-trading model found significant changes in global production, trade patterns and spot 
prices, with pipeline exporters being most affected. China's domestic production and pipeline 
imports from Central Asia are the major buffers that can offset much of the uncertainties. The 
study finds an asymmetric phenomenon. Pipeline imports are responding to China's uncertainties 
in both low and high demand scenarios while LNG imports are only responding to high demand 
scenario. The major reasons are higher TOP levels and the current practice of import only up to 
the minimum TOP levels for LNG, as well as a lack of liberalized gas markets. The study shows 
that it is necessary to create LNG markets that can respond to market dynamics, through either a 
reduction of TOP levels or change of pricing mechanisms to hub indexation. 
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1. Introduction  
China’s gas market plays an important role in the global gas market and its importance is 
expected to increase over time. In the 2015 World Energy Outlook 2015 (IEA, 2015b), the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasted that China has the highest growth prospects in 
natural gas demand from 2013 to 2040 globally. With current consumption of about 200 billion 
cubic meters (bcm), China is the world’s third-largest gas consumer (BP, 2016) and its gas 
consumption is projected to grow to about 600 bcm by 2040 (IEA, 2015b). In total, Chinese gas 
demand as a share of world gas production is expected to increase from 5% in 2015 to 11% by 
2035 (IEA, 2015b). This increased demand is met partially by increased domestic production, 
with the bulk supplemented by imports from both pipelines and LNG. IEA estimates that 
Chinese import dependence is set to increase from 30% of demand in 2015 to 40% with total 
imports up to 200bcm by 2035 (IEA, 2015a).   
Despite high growth in the early 2000s, the trend of increasing Chinese demand for natural gas 
seems to be dying down, with the growth rate in natural gas consumption reaching historical 
lows in recent years (Shi and Variam, 2015). While slow economic growth is an obvious reason, 
there are many other initiatives in China that will cast great uncertainties on China’s gas sector 
and the global gas market. The uncertainties could be due to technical reasons (such as reduction 
of shale gas production costs), regulatory reasons (such as limitation of coal usage for local 
pollution reduction and CO2 abatement), institutional reasons (such as pricing reforms and 
market liberalization), or a combination of some or all of them. 
This confluence of increased significance, import dependence and the Chinese gas market as  
wildcard when it comes to supply and demand creates much uncertainty for global gas players 
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(Ratner et al., 2016).  In particular, the uncertainties have a great impact on LNG trade as it is 
expected that the glut in the world gas markets, in particular the LNG markets, will be unlikely 
to disappear before 2020 due to factors such as contract arrangements, high capital intensity, and 
long lead times for project development (Shi, 2016b).  
While there are studies in the literature that examined the various outlooks of China’s gas supply 
and demand (Ratner et al., 2016; Shaikh and Ji, 2016; Sun Hui Shan Lei Wang, 2013; Wang et 
al., 2013a; Wang et al., 2016; Wang and Lin, 2012, 2014; Zhang, 2014; Zhu et al., 2014); to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no study quantifying the impact of China’s gas market 
uncertainties on regional and global gas markets. The regional and global impacts of China’s gas 
market sector development remain a relatively new issue for most energy researchers (Shi and 
Variam, 2015). Although many observers predict a slump in gas prices once the global market 
faces diminished Chinese demand (Butler, 2015), such impacts are not quantified.  
The current paper not only reviews and analyses the factors contributing to demand and supply 
uncertainties in China, but also estimate the impact of uncertainties on the world gas production, 
gas prices, pipeline and LNG trade. Questions to be answered in this paper include: (1) what are 
the magnitude of uncertainties in China’s gas market? (2) what factors have led to these 
significant uncertainties? (3) what would the uncertainties mean for the world gas market?  
This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the comprehensive global impacts from 
China’s gas market uncertainties, which are expected to provide reference for the international 
gas industry, in terms of project development and contract negotiation. It should also be able to 
offer implications on the ongoing changes in price indexation and trading hub initiatives in East 
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Asia, which is closely related to market conditions as demonstrated by a recent study (Shi and 
Variam, 2016). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology and the model. Section 3 
reviews and analyses both supply and demand uncertainties in the literature. Based on the 
analysis and reviews, a group of policy scenarios are proposed in Section 4, which also presents 
the modeling results and discussions. Section 5 discusses the global and regional impact of the 
results. The last section concludes the paper with policy implications.  
2. Model and Methodology  
This paper is presented as two main interrelated parts. The first part is a qualitative study where 
we review the relevant factors underpinning the uncertainties in China’s gas supply and demand. 
Based on these reviews, a group of scenarios that represents different uncertainties are proposed. 
The second portion consists of a quantitative examination of how global gas markets evolve 
under different scenarios of Chinese demand and supply change using a global gas market and 
trade model. 
The global impact of China gas market uncertainties is simulated by the Nexant World Gas 
Model (WGM) (Nexant, 2016). The WGM model, which covers every country that produces or 
consumes gas, is formulated as a linear programing model with minimization of global gas 
procurement costs (including production costs and transport costs) as the objective. The model is 
a mirror of gas sector in reality without dynamic intervention of government. Strategic 
government intervention can be modelled as infrastructure start dates, and change in price 
indexation (wherever applicable), taxes and production subsidies. The model includes all known 
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sales contracts including source and destination, Annual Contract Quantity (ACQ), start and end 
dates, price formula, and active and planned infrastructure. The model minimizes cost of 
production and transportation to meet projected demand, subject to infrastructure constraints. 
Flows within nodes are constrained according to the available infrastructure and within the 
bounds of long term contracts where appropriate. Countries are modelled as nodes in WGM. The 
model captures flows at the node level by pipeline and LNG and contracted and un-contracted 
flows are separately identified. While most countries are modelled as single node, larger 
countries are further divided into several nodes. Nodes are balanced on a quarterly basis to 
account for seasonal demand variations, supply swing, flexibility of delivery infrastructure and 
storage capacities. The model is optimized at node level but the results are aggregated to country 
and even regional blocks to simplify the presentation.  
Detailed explanation of the model, the regional classification, key assumptions and inputs, and 
the discussion of results from reference scenario can be found in Shi and Variam (2016) .  
3. Chinese Gas Market Uncertainties 
3.1. Demand uncertainty 
Generally, opinions seem to align around a largely optimistic view on the natural demand in 
China. While demand growth is relatively assured, the rate of demand growth is uncertain. The 
uncertainty on the magnitude of future growth is clearly illustrated in the disparities between 
official, academic as well as private sector forecasts. According to a review of existing literature 
on forecasts of Chinese demand from governmental, industry and academic sources, the range of 
demand forecast for 2020 lies between 270 bcm to 500 bcm and 400 bcm to 700 bcm for 2030 
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(Figure 1; Compiled from (CCR, 2013; Chen, 2013; CNPC, 2016a; Diao et al., 2014; Gastreich 
et al., 2013; Guo and Zhou, 2015; IEA, 2015a, 2016; IEEJ, 2015; NDRC, 2014a; Por, 2013; 
Rogers and Stern, 2014; Shaikh and Ji, 2016; Shi, 2016a; Trevor and Bao, 2013; Zeng and Li, 
2016; Zhang, 2014; Zhang and Yang, 2015). The magnitude of the degree of uncertainty is best 
illustrated by the fact that even the differential between the highest and lowest forecasted 
demand is more than China’ gas consumption in 2015 (196 bcm, as reported by (CNPC, 2016b) ) 
and close to the size of the global traded LNG in 2015 (245 Mt, about 300 bcm) (GIIGNL, 2016). 
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Further evidence of uncertainty can be observed from frequent revisions of not only private 
sector forecasts, but also official state goals and targets. In November 2014, the State Council 
(2014b) released the “Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020)” which forecasted 
that natural gas will account for more than 10% of the total primary energy consumption of 4.8 
Gt coal equivalent by 2020, equivalent to 360 bcm annual consumption (State Council, 2014b). 
This represented a downward revision from an earlier more ambitious official estimate of 400 to 
420 bcm per annum by 2020 (Rogers, 2015). The 2014 figures were downgraded again in 2015 
to about 295 bcm per annum, in alignment with the November 2014 IEA World Energy Outlook 
(WEO) New Policies Scenario (Rogers, 2015). Such almost annual revisions of natural gas 
consumption estimates are reflective of the current state of uncertainty in the Chinese gas 
markets. 
3.2. Supply uncertainty 
On the supply side, outlooks in the literature are also diversified. The forecasted Chinese natural 
gas production (including both conventional and unconventional gas) in 2020 ranges from 150 
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bcm to 270 bcm (Figure 2; Complied from (BP, 2015; CCR, 2013; CEFC, 2013; Diao et al., 
2014; IEA, 2015a, 2016; IEEJ, 2015; Li et al., 2016; Rogers and Stern, 2014; State Council, 
2014b; Trevor and Bao, 2013; Wang et al., 2013b; Zhang, 2014).  
 [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Similar to the case of gas demand, there are constant revisions of official state targets and 
forecasts. In the Five-Year Shale Gas Development Plan, released by the Chinese government in 
March 2012, it is targeted that an annual domestic shale gas production will reach 6.5 bcm in 
2015, which will further increase to 60-100 bcm by 2020 (Andrews-Speed et al., 2015). In 
November 2014, the State Council (2014b) released the “Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (2014-2020)”, which revised the target numbers for shale gas production downwards to 30 
bcm in the face of a variety of development challenges. 
An objective review of the situation is further complicated by the optimist view private sector 
players hold on shale development in China. Despite initial setbacks, the commercialization of 
Sinopec’s FuLing block and CNPC’s three shale blocks seem to raise trust in the ability to 
capitalize on domestic shale resources (Chen, 2014).  
3.3. Factors that contribute to uncertainty 
The factors that contribute to both demand and supply uncertainty include uncertain total future 
energy demand, which may be affected by factors such as rate of economic growth, population 
growth rate and rate of urbanization, among others; and uncertainty in energy mix, in particular, 
the battle between coal and natural gas, which could be affected by environmental regulations, 
international oil and gas prices, and market liberalization. 
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3.3.1. Economic slowdown and structural changes 
In recent years, China is facing a slowdown in economic growth as a result of the “new normal” 
economic model, where it is expected that structural changes towards a technological, innovation 
and service centric growth is overshadowing the previous secondary and manufacturing sector as 
the vehicle of growth. Such changes are expected to reduce the total energy demand, and 
therefore affect future gas demand. The first degree of uncertainty associated with these changes 
is that the magnitude of the slowdown and structural changes remains a point of controversy, 
which casts doubt on future forecasts of natural gas demand.   
A second layer of uncertainty is added since the relationship between these macroeconomic 
changes and the domestic gas demand is also not clear. While some observers note that the 
slowdown of economic growth and the shift towards less energy-intensive sector of growth have 
contributed to the reduction in total final energy demand, and therefore natural gas demand, 
(Green and Stern, 2015); others argue that, given the low contribution of gas in the energy mix, 
uncertainties underpinning the overall energy mix is unlikely to be a significant factor affecting 
natural gas demand (IEA, 2015a).  
3.3.2. Environmental regulations 
Another cause of uncertainty for China’s future gas outlook will be the country’s forthcoming 
climate policy and the corresponding environment regulations. In recent years, environmental 
concerns are replacing economic growth targets during policymaking discussions. Furthermore, 
China’s high profile policy directives to reduce both local (ambient) pollution and global (carbon 
emissions) pollution have illustrated the political determination in tackling such issues. 
Environmental regulations may have a positive impact on future natural gas demand as may 
increase the attractiveness of natural gas vis-à-vis other fossil fuel based energy sources. 
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However, under similar logic, stricter environmental regulations may favor cleaner renewable 
energy resources over gas. Moreover, given the strain gas extraction process has on the 
environment, stringent environmental regulations may deter domestic gas production volumes. 
In the power generation sector, the policy direction to move away from coal-fired power plants 
so as to combat environmental pollution is clear. In a series of policy documents, starting from 
the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan issued by the State Council in 20131 to the 
12th and 13th Five Year Plan, the Chinese government have shown a growing commitment to 
replace coal with cleaner and more efficient generation source to improve ambient air quality (by 
reducing PM 2.5 and smog). State directives to reduce the share of coal in primary energy supply 
from 70% in 2012 to 65% in 2017 were issued. Aggressive state policies have been also 
implemented in various sectors, with key target focus in areas such as reducing the demand for 
coal, setting up de-nitrification facilities, shifting away from obsolete industry capacity as well as 
promoting clean energy consumption (Chen, 2014). Natural gas being a relatively clean fossil 
fuel, offer an appropriate alternative to fill the gap, thus potentially affecting future gas demand.   
In more developed regions, such as the Jing-Jin-Ji (Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei), Yangtze River Delta 
and Peer River Delta, a mix of scaling down coal fired power plants, restrictions on new coal 
fired generation capacity, phasing out of small coal boilers and speeding up of coal-to-gas 
conversion programs are seen (Chen, 2014). In Jing-Jin-Ji and Shandong, the target to reduce 
coal demand by 85 million tonnes by 2017 is equivalent to adding an approximate 50bcm to the 
country’s gas demand. When coupled with the actions of other provinces in containing and 
reducing coal consumption, the aggregated effect on additional gas demand is expected to be 
significant. 
                                                          
1 Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/12/content_2486773.htm  
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However, natural gas is not the only resource which can fill the energy deficit. Renewable 
energy projects remain a strong contender to fill the potential energy deficit left by coal. The 
competition between energy sources is best illustrated by the Chinese target of increasing the 
share of non-fossil fuels and gas in its energy mix to 20% each by 2030 to meet its target to peak 
carbon emissions by 2030 and reduce its carbon intensity by a minimum of 60% by 2030, from a 
base year of 2005.  
Such explicit policy directions will serve to prop up demand, though the extent of influence is 
unknown. In fact, the introduction of a national carbon market in 2017 may place renewables at 
an advantage over gas. Furthermore, the level of restriction on coal-fired power plants is unclear, 
particularly since the coal industry remains a key sector providing rural employment for the 
nation (Shi, 2011).  
In the heating sector, the fuel switch from coal to gas in heating presents much potential in China. 
As such, various local and provincial governments are seen to be introducing support systems to 
promote such a switch. The Beijing provincial government have introduced an up to 50% 
subsidy on project costs for replacing a coal boiler with a gas-based one, dependent on the size of 
the boiler, while Hebei is set to shut down any coal boilers smaller than 10 steam tonne (IEA, 
2015a). 
3.3.3. Uncertainty of shale gas development 
 
Uncertainty surrounding shale gas production contributes to a degree of variation in domestic gas 
production estimates in China. The inconsistent shale gas outlook is more or less driven by three 
factors: reserve, production cost and environmental regulation. While the first uncertainty will 
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affect the total amount of shale gas supply, the later uncertainty, which mainly depends on 
technology progress, will affect the timeline that the shale gas will come to the market. 
Environmental regulation, on the other hand, determines if the shale resources will be exploited. 
According to EIA (2015), as of 2013, China’s unproved technically recoverable shale gas 
reserves was 31.6 tcm, more than eight times of its total proven gas reserve (3800 bcm or 3.8 tcm) 
in 2015 (BP, 2016). In a recent paper, Wang et al. (2016) highlight that Technically Recoverable 
Resources, which are more useful for production forecast, have a range between 4 tcm to 45 tcm. 
Wang et al. (2016) further highlight that even the most credible estimates from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration/Advanced Resources International Inc (EIA/ARI) and the Ministry 
of Land Resources (MLR) in China, are mostly preliminary, and are contested by many scholars. 
With such large variances in resource estimates, some optimists even suggest the potential of gas 
self-sufficiency for China (Ryan, 2012).  
While some argue that discrepancies with regards to technical reserves are not uncommon, a 
significant portion of variability actually derives from external challenges such as poorly suited 
and complex geology and water shortages, institutional challenges (acreage ownership issues and 
lack of third party access to infrastructure), and cost issues (high cost of wells) (Chen, 2014).  
The ability to tap its shale resources is dependent on the production cost, which will determine 
project profitability and guide development decisions. The current higher costs of shale gas 
relative to conventional gas deter the large scale development of shale gas. (Ren et al., 2015) 
citing data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, observes that the wellhead cost of shale gas in 
China in 2015 to be around US$11.20 $/MMBtu, compared to the cost for the exploitation of dry 
gas in US (3.40$/MMBtu). Further evidence can be obtained from Tian et al. (2014), which 
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brought into focus the financial losses faced by Sinopec and CNPC who were able to get 
US$10.87/Mcf (inclusive of an estimated wellhead gas price of about $9.06/Mcf and the subsidy 
for shale gas at $1.81/Mcf) after an initial investment of US$0.37 billion and $0.64 billion in 
investment for 2.58 Bcf and  2.47 Bcf of gas development, respectively. While improved 
technology and experience are likely to push down costs, at what speed remains to be a question.  
Governmental policies to subsidize production costs may serve to reduce costs, but such policy 
support faces much uncertainty into the future. First implemented in 2012, China has a regressive 
subsidy policy to shale gas developers. In 2012, the government announced a fiscal subsidy 
policy of is 0.4 yuan/m3 for shale gas to be effective from 2013 to 2015 (Ministry of Finance, 
2012).The subsidy allocated from 2016 to 2018 is 0.3 yuan/m3, with a further reduction to 0.2 
yuan/ m3 from 2019 to 2020 (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Top domestic energy companies have 
been calling for an extension of the subsidy to 2030 (Ministry of Finance, 2016), which under 
current policy environment, is not an exaggerated option, but the outcome remains uncertain. 
Environmental regulations may also have an impact on shale gas production. Current literature 
seem to agree than the potential environment risks of shale gas production in China are greater 
than that in the United States (Krupnick et al., 2014). One of the most pressing issue at hand is 
the water-related risks. Citing Guo et al. (2014) and Yang et al, (2014), (Wang et al., 2014; Yang 
et al., 2013) states that each of the shale wells in China consume an estimated of 10,000m3 to 
24,000m3 of water daily, which strains the delicate balance between water consumption for shale 
development and other socio-economic goals, especially in the arid areas in the Tarim Basin. 
Such constraints were further highlighted by a report by World Resources Institutes (WRI), in 
which they estimate that more than 60% of China’s shale resources face high water stress, which 
creates business risks for companies operating in these areas (Reig et al., 2014). Unfavorable 
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conditions are further exacerbated by the high population density in these areas (Reig et al., 
2014). Pollution of both surface and ground water was also highlighted by (Wang et al., 2014) as 
a potential cause of concern. Citing fieldwork in the Sichuan Basin in June 2013, it was revealed 
that due to high monitoring costs, some shale gas operators tend to overlook water pollution 
regulations. Furthermore, due to high penalties for ground water pollution, some businesses even 
choose to pollute surface water (Wang et al., 2014). Should regulation targeting such 
environment constraints tighten, shale gas production may be adversely affected.  
3.3.4. Price uncertainty and institutional changes  
A further source of uncertainty will be the price and regulatory uncertainty surrounding the 
Chinese gas market. Natural gas is losing out in both absolute and relative economic 
competitiveness in the previous era of stable oil and low coal prices (IEA, 2015a). A 
combination of reliance on imported gas, high import costs and regulated end-user prices have 
negatively affected profitability of the natural gas sector and may have strong impact on the 
future of the industry, and the overall demand. China is reliant on import for over 60% of its 
natural gas consumption(IEA, 2015a). With an average LNG import price of USD 11/MMBtu in 
2014, the highest price recorded at USD 20/MMBtu, and pipeline imports coming at a cost of 
USD 9.5/MMBtu, the corresponding increase in end-user prices have a limited effect in bridging 
profitability gaps (IEA, 2015a). This loss of competitiveness may have been the main contributor 
to the slowdown of natural gas demand growth from the average 14% per annum(p.a.) in the 
period 2009-2013, to the 8% to 9% p.a. in 2014 (Blume, 2015; IEA, 2015a).  
While the current low import prices could have spurred demand response (Shi, 2016b), it has not 
been the case in China because the regulated domestic pricing have prevented the final 
consumers from benefiting from the low import prices. Even more so, gas demand could be 
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discouraged due to cheaper alternatives to gas, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) on the 
eastern coast markets.  
In this case, the ongoing efforts to liberalize domestic gas prices and markets create another layer 
of uncertainty, in addition to the uncertainty to the global gas prices. In recent years, favorable 
policies could be seen from the market liberalization process and the interest in reforming 
domestic natural gas pricing. Historically, the Chinese government controlled the price of natural 
gas using a cost-plus approach which was replaced by netback pricing mechanism (Shi and 
Variam, 2015). However, there are still a few distortions: the city-gate prices are still set by 
NDRC without transparent information on procedure and frequency and cannot reflect the real 
time market fundamentals. The consequence is particularly serious in the current period of sharp 
fluctuating prices. Secondly, residential gas prices are still distorted by the regulated tiered price 
mechanism.  
Under the current policy environment, there seems to be various new policy reforms in the 
pipelines, such as liberalization of retail prices, which may affect consumption patterns (Shi and 
Variam, 2015). A liberalization of the wholesale and retail prices will affect the relative prices of 
gas to other fuels and thus affect both gas demand and supply through partly altering the share of 
natural gas in the total energy demand. In addition, the likely subsequent intention towards the 
establishment of gas trading hubs will shift the pricing reform toward spot indexation gas pricing. 
This process will not only change the domestic gas sector, but also influence gas imports through 
indexing import to benchmark hub prices. The impact of a hub indexation will not only affect the 
Chinese gas market, but also the regional and global gas markets due to the significant size of 
China’s gas market at the present and in the future (Shi and Variam, 2015, 2016).  
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In addition to the pricing mechanism, many other potential institutional changes will also be 
expected to affect the natural gas sector.  
Firstly, liberalization in the upstream that is envisioned by the top decision makers (The 18th 
Central Committee of CPC, 2013) may incentivize shale gas and other unconventional gas 
development through non-economic measures, such as enhanced access to resources and land, 
which are traditionally dominated by the NOCs (Andrews-Speed et al., 2015). The largely 
monopolistic control over upstream exploration rights is also a source of concern for the scale of 
shale gas development. Currently, allocation of gas block possession is carried out by the State 
Council (Zhang et al., 2015). Although it is theoretically possible for individuals and private 
companies to obtain a license for upstream shale gas exploration rights, the market remains 
dominated by large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). (Ren et al., 2015) estimates the state-owned 
enterprises, including CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation), China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec), and Shaanxi Yanchang Petroleum Co., Ltd, owned or controlled about 80% 
of shale gas resources in 2013. Learning from the US shale gas experience, (Ren et al., 
2015)observed that the involvement of private sector companies could expedite land transfer or 
leasing.  
Secondly, mandatory implementation of third party access to LNG receiving terminals and 
pipelines can boost competition and link domestic gas market the regional and world LNG prices. 
On top of this, lower economic growth and regulated high gas prices have led to slowing gas 
demand growth in China and concerns that China will struggle to absorb the increase in 
contracted LNG volumes (Dodge, 2016).  However, this will be changed sooner or later once the 
third party access policy is functioning.  
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Lastly, the development of LNG terminals owned by the private sector will also further integrate 
the Chinese domestic markets to the world markets. Due to regulations, the private gas players 
did not have the privilege to sign long term LNG contracts and thus avoided the locked in of high 
costs and inflexible LNG supplies. With the decentralization of LNG terminal approval (State 
Council, 2014a), the private gas importers are now more likely to have their own terminals 
which will bring gas whenever it is profitable (Platts, 2015). Since the domestic prices for 
imported LNG was allowed to be market determined in September 2014 (NDRC, 2014b), a 
further proliferation of privately owned LNG terminals will change the domestic prices and have 
an impact on both gas supply and demand.  
4. Modeling and results 
As the discussion above have illustrated there are various contributing factors of uncertainty 
underpinning the Chinese market. Complexities arise when the various factors interact with each 
other, further complicating analysis in the subject matter. An analysis whereby the one parameter 
is changed whereas others remain ceteris paribus can be largely unrealistic, given the 
interdependency of the factors described above. Therefore, to better present a holistic 
representation of potential pathways for the Chinese natural gas market going into the future, we 
have decided to base our analysis on broad demand and supply shocks in the Chinese market. 
While recognizing the potential inadequacy of such assumptions, we deem this approach to be in 
alignment with the purpose of this paper, which aims to understand the impacts of changes in 
Chinese demand and supply shocks on the global market.  
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4.1. Scenario setting  
As such,  we have formulated three policy scenarios, covering both demand and supply shocks,  
shale gas development, in addition to the reference scenario (Table 1).  
In our reference scenario (REF), we adopt the domestic gas demand projections from the New 
Policy Scenario (NPS) in the IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2016 (IEA, 2015b). The shale 
gas production was constructed broadly based on the WEO 2015 NPS estimates for Chinese 
unconventional gas, with linear extrapolation methods being used to estimate figures for 
intermediate years between 2020, 2030 and 2035. The use of 2015 data was due to data 
availability restrictions in the 2016 report. Under the reference scenario, we also assume that the 
Eastern pipeline (Power of Siberia) from Russia will start operations in 2020, with an initial 
annual export capacity of 10bcm in the first two years, which will be ramped up to 28 bcm in 
2022, and to 38 bcm per annum in 2024. The Western pipeline (Altai route) will also be 
operational in 2030 with a capacity of 30 bcm per annum. 
To address demand uncertainty, a high demand and a low demand scenario are constructed. Both 
low and high demand forecasts are in line with data obtained from CNPC(CNPC, 2016a). Given 
that CNPC data only provides forecasts up to 2030, forecasts to 2035 are estimated as a linear 
expolation of the average growth of the previous 10 years.  
In modelling possible supply uncertainties, we have decided to focus on the variability in shale 
gas production. Considering that the IEA baseline shale gas production estimate is lower than the 
Chinese government target, and the uncertainties of a lower shale gas production will be minor, 
we do not simulate any low shale gas production scenario. For the high domestic shale gas 
production scenario, we performed a linear extrapolation on high Chinese unconventional gas 
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production estimates available in the IEA World Energy Outlook 2015 (IEA, 2015b). Table 1 
below summarizes our assumptions.  
[INSERT TABLE 1HERE] 
The incremental demand from both scenarios is summarized in Figure 3. The overall increase in 
demand from China is+35 bcm/year (overall +9% over base case) on average for “High Demand” 
scenario and -66 bcm/year (overall-17% over base case) in Chinese demand for the period 2015-
2035 in “Low Demand” scenario. The impact of the positive and negative demand shock from 
the perspective of overall global demand is at +0.8% and -1.5% respectively. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3HERE] 
 
4.2. Reference scenario 
In the reference scenario, global gas production and consumption is projected to increase at a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.6% from 3550 bcm in 2015 to 4860 bcm in 2035 
(Figure 4). Incremental global gas supply comes from North America, Former Soviet Union 
(Russia and Caspian countries), Middle East and Australia (Figure 4). Most of the consumption 
increase is observed in China, Middle East and India. The natural gas consumption from China 
and India are projected to grow at a CAGR of 5.1% and 5.5% respectively during the period 
2015-2035.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Global LNG exports are expected to increase at a CAGR of 3.6% from 330 bcm in 2015 to 670 
bcm in 2035 (Figure 5). Key LNG trade routes are Australia to Japan, Korea and China (East 
Asia), South East Asia to East Asia, Middle East to East Asia, Middle East to India, North 
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America to North East Asia and North America to Europe. Pipeline gas flows increase at a 
moderate CAGR of 1.9% from 2020 bcm in 2015 to 2920 bcm in 2035 (Figure 5). Major 
pipeline export trade routes are Russia to Europe, Central Asia to China, Russia to China and 
North Africa to Europe. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Natural gas spot prices are expected to see a decline from 2015 till around 2020, in line with 
decline in oil prices, before rising steadily to original price levels at around $10/MMBtu in Asia 
and Europe.  Asian prices are generally higher than European and North American gas prices 
(Figure 6).  
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
 
4.3. High Demand and Low Demand scenarios 
Under both upward and downward demand shock, China is able to adjust its domestic production 
to meet most of its changing needs, and stabilize the domestic natural gas market. Domestic 
production in China increases by an average +15bcm/year (55% of domestic consumption 
increase) in high demand scenario, while domestic production decreases by an average 40 
bcm/year (64% of domestic consumption decrease) on low demand scenario. The high cost 
production fields (at the margin) and limited unconventional gas production at market prices 
make production ‘upward sticky’ in satisfying the shock in demand.  
Besides altering domestic production, Chinese gas demand changes also have large impacts on 
the natural gas market in Central Asia whose production changes to cater to the changing 
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demand from China in both scenarios (Figure 7.a). This is due to i) Central Asian (Caspian) gas 
supply contracts are relatively flexible in Take-Or-Pay (TOP) provisions when compared to LNG 
contracts; and ii) Pipe imported gas from Central Asia is cost competitive with LNG and can 
bridge the supply gaps in high demand scenario. North American production is also seen to be 
increasing after 2030 when new supply to North East Asia starts. In the low demand scenario, the 
Southeast Asian production replace the North American production to be the third responding 
source. However, the magnitude of change in Southeast Asian production is much smaller than 
the two leading one: China and Caspian production. For the rest regions, the change of 
production is minor (Figure 7.b). 
 [INSERT FIGURE 7.a and 7.b HERE] 
Increased Chinese demand not satisfied by domestic production increase is met by LNG imports 
(61%) and by pipeline imports (39%) in the high demand scenario. LNG imports to China 
increase by 152 bcm. More than 64% of the increased exports to China come from Southeast 
Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia) and Australia. LNG exports from Middle East and Africa bridge 
the gap with remaining 36% share (Figure 8.a). Under high demand scenario, import pipeline 
capacity utilization rises close to 100% in China, and is a limiting factor in further growth in pipe 
exports. Pipeline imports increase by 97 bcm over the forecast period, with 90% of the increased 
imports come from Caspian and Russia (Figure 8.b). Russian exports start only after 2020 in line 
with the start of pipeline (Eastern route), which displaces some of the incremental exports from 
Caspian countries.  
[INSERT FIGURE 8.a and FIGURE 8.b HERE] 
 
Decreased Chinese demand not satisfied through decrease in domestic production, is almost all 
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met through decreased pipeline imports (97%) from Central Asia and Russia (Fig 9.b). In 
contrast, LNG imports to China do not change very much. (Figure 9.a) 
Under both high and low demand scenarios, the demand increase/shortfall are met by either 
altering domestic production or through adjusting pipeline imports. Only in the high demand 
scenario whereby pipeline capacity are nearly maximized are spot LNG imports employed. Thus 
pipeline exports from Central Asia and Russia have the potential to act as the swing supply 
source in demand shock scenario in China. This is also due to LNG supply already at TOP level 
and any reductions beyond the minimum level are not taken due to higher cost of penalty.  
[INSERT FIGURE 9.a and FIGURE 9.b HERE] 
Spot prices in China increase on an average by US$ 1.45/ MMBtu from 2020 to 2035 in the high 
demand scenario and spot prices decrease on an average by US$ 2.1/ MMBtu from over the 
same period in the low demand scenario (Figure 10.a). China’s high demand will have more 
impact on South East Asia and Australia prices, the largest source of LNG to China, than the low 
demand scenarios due to LNG’s reduced responsiveness to demand shocks (Figure 10.b). Spot 
prices are also affected in Russia, the largest source of pipeline imports. The impact on prices in 
other regions is not significant.  
[INSERT FIGURE 10.a and FIGURE 10.b HERE] 
4.4. High shale production scenarios 
Under a high domestic shale gas production in China scenario, the LNG imports to China remain 
unchanged. Changes of production are observed in China and Caspian (Figure 11).  
[INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE] 
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High shale production has limited impact on Chinas LNG imports due to the relative contract 
inflexibility of LNG imports (Figure 12.a). The decrease in Caspian production is on account of 
the high domestic shale gas production from China directly displacing the pipeline imports from 
Caspian and Russia (Figure 12.b). 
[INSERT FIGURE 12.a and FIGURE 12.b HERE] 
A high shale production will marginally depress major regional spot prices, with the exception of 
Henry Hub. The largest price drop is observed in China spot prices, followed by Russian spot 
prices (Figure 13). The Chinese prices declines due to i) The production of more shale gas at 
current production cost increases supply options; and ii) increased supply makes the Chinese 
domestic market less tight leading to lower spot prices. 
[INSERT FIGURE 13 HERE] 
5. Discussion 
The simulations found that China’s domestic production and imports from Central Asia and 
Russia are the major buffers that can offset much of the uncertainties in demand and supply. 
Chinese gas demand changes have large impacts on the natural gas market in Central Asia whose 
production changes to cater to the changing demand from China in both the demand scenarios.  
There are increased pipeline exports in case of high demand and decreased exports in the low 
demand scenario. Thus, pipeline exports from Central Asia and Russia respond to the demand 
uncertainties in China. In contrast, LNG exports change only during the high demand scenario. 
The simulations demonstrate that China’ uncertainties will have significant impact on domestic 
prices and only marginal impact on natural gas prices in major gas markets. The largest impact 
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on spot prices are observed in regions where exports change the most in response to Chinese 
demand uncertainties.  
The impact of China’s uncertainties on global LNG market is asymmetric between high and low 
demand scenarios. In the high demand case, the impact on LNG market is magnified as the 
additional volume of LNG can be sourced from a diverse pool of suppliers and there is little 
capacity limit given China’s current underutilized regasification capacity. In contrast, the fixed 
pipeline capacity limit the upward flexibility of pipeline exports in responding to high demand. 
In the high demand scenario, Southeast Asian LNG imports to China will increase to bridge the 
supply gap. However, in the low demand case, the impact on global LNG markets is very much 
reduced, with most of the uncertainties borne by changes in Chinese pipeline imports.  
We suspect that the asymmetries in market behavior between the LNG and pipeline gas and 
between high demand and low demand scenarios are due to the more rigorous contract terms of 
LNG imports, as compared to pipeline imports. The TOP level in LNG contracts is typically set 
at an average of 85% while the TOP for pipeline contracts to China is at an average of 70%. Due 
to the current and projected low oil prices, China’s long term contracted LNG prices are not cost 
competitive and thus the Chinese importers only takes the minimum TOP levels and there is no 
room for further reduction in LNG imports in the lower demand scenario. As a result, Chinas has 
to shut-down its most expensive domestic production and relatively flexible pipeline imports 
from the Caspian exporters when faced with downward uncertainties.  
To examine the impact of TOP provisions, we remove TOP restriction in all Chinese LNG 
import contracts from 2015 under the low demand scenario. Results support our hypotheses that 
the lack of response from the LNG market in the low demand scenario is due to TOP restrictions 
 
24 
 
that prevent reductions in LNG supply. When we remove TOP obligations from the Chinese 
LNG imports, China’s LNG imports from all regions will be reduced throughout the study period 
(Figure 14).  
[INSERT FIGURE 14 HERE] 
Pipeline imports to China also experience significant changes. Central Asian and Russian 
imports are impacted if LNG TOP obligation is removed. However, the onset of reductions is 
delayed due to effect of reduced LNG flows till 2025. Southeast pipeline (from Myanmar), 
however, is robust to the LNG TOP change (Figure 15).  
[INSERT FIGURE 15 HERE] 
Moreover, China’s production also marginally increases. This suggest that China’s domestic 
production is cost competitive to LNG imports but its growth potential is inhibited by the 
minimum TOP clauses in the low demand scenario. In other words, LNG exporters from other 
regions, except Southeast Asia, are protected by the TOP provisions in LNG contracts. Unless 
there is a way to renegotiate and reduce the TOP level for those LNG contracts, China’s gas 
market uncertainties will continue to put pressure on pipeline gas imports. The role of LNG as 
the flexible source of supply in uncertain demand is diminished in a rigid contractual 
environment with tight TOP and DES clauses. Lower contractual restrictions in a no TOP 
scenario are beneficial for the world. Total procurement cost of the world declines (Table 2) in 
the China Low Demand – No TOP scenario when compared to Low Demand with TOP. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The stability of LNG due to TOP and other commercial arrangements may cause distort market 
behaviors, and is unsustainable. An ongoing initiative in the East Asian region in creating spot 
LNG markets through liberalization of the LNG contracts may lead to lower TOP levels in the 
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current and future contracts (Shi and Variam, 2016).  In this dynamic process, the transition to 
moving away from oil indexation through price review and arbitration may have to be initiated in 
China.  
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
China’s gas demand is expected to account for a growing share of the world total demand; hence 
its uncertainties will likely have significant impacts on regional and global trade of LNG, 
pipeline gas and their prices. This study quantifies the impact of Chinese uncertainties on global 
gas markets. Specifically, our results showed changes in Chinese demand have an asymmetric 
impact on LNG and Pipeline: pipeline exports are responding to both the upside and downsides 
of China’s demand uncertainties while LNG exports only are only responding to high demand.  
The major reasons are higher TOP levels in LNG contracts than pipeline contracts and the 
current practice of import only up to the minimum TOP levels, as well as a lack of liberalized 
gas markets.  
The study also shows that it is necessary to create functioning LNG markets that can respond to 
market dynamics. Either reduction of TOP levels or change of pricing mechanisms to hub prices 
in LNG contracts would contribute to a functioning LNG markets. While the LNG exporters are 
shielded from China’s uncertainties by the TOP obligation and other commercial arrangement 
for the time being, such restrictions that fails to reflect market fundamentals are not sustainable. 
There are ongoing efforts to create spot LNG and gas markets in East Asia (see Shi and Variam 
(2016) for more details). If the LNG markets are forced to response to China’s low demand in 
the future by reducing contract restrictions the high cost producers, such as Australia will suffer 
more (see Shi and Variam (2015) for more details). In this sense, high costs LNG suppliers will 
 
26 
 
tend to maintain the current rigorous LNG contract arrangement.  It also implied that China 
should further pursue flexible gas contract arrangements to allow it gas markets to follow 
economics in the markets, and thus to be able to benefit from low costs of imports.   
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